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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 970347-CA 
v. : 
BILLY ARELLANO, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance within 
a correctional facility, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(c) (1996). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish that defendant's 
possession of an envelope containing cocaine was knowing and intentional? "When 
a jury verdict is challenged on insufficiency grounds, [an appellate court] reviews the 
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. [An appellate court will] reverse a jury conviction 
for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive 
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. 
Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 235 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted); see also State v. Burk. 
839 P.2d 880 (Utah App.), cert.denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
2. Did the prosecutor's lack of strict compliance with a statutory notice 
provision mandate a continuance or exclusion of expert testimony "as a matter of 
law" where defendant failed to show prejudice? The decision to grant or deny a 
continuance or exclude testimony for failure to comply with discovery obligations is 
reviewed for "clear abuse of discretion." State v. Begishe. 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah 
App. 1997) (citing State v. Cabututan. 861 P.2d 408, 413 (Utah 1993)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and (2)(c) (1996): 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess . . . a controlled substance. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while 
inside the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional 
facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of 
confinement [is guilty of a second degree felony]. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1)(a), (l)(b), and (3) (1995): 
(l)(a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to 
testify in a felony case at trial. . . , the party intending to call the expert 
shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable but not less 
than 30 days before t r i a l . . . . Notice shall include the name and address 
of the expert, the expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's 
report. 
2 
(b) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the 
proposed testimony. If the expert has not prepared a report or the report 
does not adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's 
proposed testimony including any opinion and the bases and reasons of 
that opinion, the party intending to call the expert shall provide the 
opposing party a written explanation of the expert's anticipated testimony 
sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet 
the testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by the expert 
when available. . . . 
(3) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the 
requirements of this section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a 
continuance of the trial. . . sufficient to allow preparation to meet the 
testimony. If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is 
the result of bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall 
impose appropriate sanctions. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to 
the defense upon request the following material or information of which 
he has knowledge: . . . 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or 
codefendant; . . . 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court 
determines on good cause shown should be made available 
to the defendant in order for the defendant to adequately 
prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable 
following the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to 
plead. The prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. . . . 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought 
to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this 
rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, 
grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not 
disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the 
circumstances. 
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Utah R. Evid. 702: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, 
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, an inmate at the Utah State Prison, was charged with possession of a 
controlled substance (cocaine) within a correctional facility, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(c) (1996) (R. 8-9). He was convicted by a 
jury, sentenced to serve one-to-fifteen years in prison (consecutively with his prior 
term), and given credit for time served (R. 72, 98). He timely appealed (R. 99-100). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Point I - Offense2 
Defendant was on the receiving end of a drug drop from another inmate. 
1
 The pleadings file in this case covers R. 1-117. The clerk numbered the cover 
pages of the two volumes of trial transcript 118 and 119 respectively, but did not 
independently number the succeeding pages in each volume. See Utah R. App. P. 
11(b)(2)(A). Therefore, following the convention used in defendant's brief, pages of 
trial transcript will be cited in this brief as R. 118 or R. 119, with the internal page 
numbers of the respective volume following in brackets, e.g.. "R. 118 [27-28]." 
2
 As defense counsel conceded at trial, the essential facts regarding the offense 
are not in dispute (R. 119 [94]; cf. Def. Br. at 10). What defendant disputes are the 
reasonable inferences which may be drawn from those facts. Under well-settled law, 
this court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). 
Proper application of this principle is central to resolving defendant's insufficiency 
claim. 
4 
Defendant and his codefendant were on a food detail serving dinner to inmates in 
their cells (R. 118 [7, 18]; 119 [95-96, 120-121]). There were only three other inmates 
on the food detail outside their cells at the time: two inmates under guard counting 
meals in the "servery", and one inmate, like defendant and codefendant, who was 
taking food from the "servery" to inmates in their cells (R. 118 [41, 53, 55-57, 69]; see 
State's Exhibit 8, addendum G).3 
Defendant and his codefendant were housed in different sections of the prison 
(R. 118 [18, 20-23, 50]; 119 [125, 138-139]; see State's Exhibits l4 and 7 [addendum 
F], and Defendant's Exhibit 12). The codefendant was taking food from the guarded 
"servery" to his section of the prison, and defendant and another inmate were serving 
food in their section (R. 118 [17-19, 21]). 
To move food from the common "servery" to the cells in their respective 
sections, the inmates had to cross a multi-purpose room where three guards were eating 
their dinner (R. 118 [19, 61]; State's Exhibits 1, 2 [addendum A], and 4 [addendum 
C], and Defendant's Exhibit 12). From mere, they had to enter a central glassed-in 
area known as the "Sally Port" (R. 118 [14, 21-23, 27, 34-35, 68-69]; State's Exhibits 
3
 Color copies of Exhibits 2-8, and 11 are at addenda A through H, 
respectively. 
4
 A black and white photocopy of a portion of State's Exhibit 1 (a diagram of the 
prison) is at addendum I. 
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1, 5 [addendum D], and 6 [addendum E], and Defendant's Exhibit 12). Inmates on 
the food detail were allowed to enter the "Sally Port" unescorted (R. 118 [72]). 
In the middle of the "Sally Port" was a control room, with windows extending 
above four waist-high cinder block walls, manned by a guard sitting in a high-backed 
chair at a control panel facing the three sections that housed inmates (R. 118 [14-16, 
31-32]). The seated guard's back was toward the entrance to the "Sally Port" used by 
inmates coming from the "servery." IdL In addition, paper was taped on the windows 
in the corner of the control room closest to that entrance to provide some privacy for 
persons using the control room toilet (R. 118 [33-34]; State's Exhibit 3 [addendum 
B]). On the floor in the corresponding corner of the "Sally Port" outside the control 
room there was a metal book depository (R. 118 [31, 37]; see State's Exhibits 1, 3 
[addendum H], 5-6, and 11, and Defendant's Exhibit 12). Although the multi-purpose 
room was lighted, the "Sally Port" itself was not (R. 118 [35]). This was by design to 
create a kind of light barrier so that inmates could not see easily into the control room. 
Id. Reflections off the glass could also make it difficult for guards in the multi-purpose 
room to see clearly into the "Sally Port" itself (see State's Exhibits 5 and 6). 
The three guards who were eating dinner in the multi-purpose room always sat at 
the same table, the one farthest from the entrance to the "Sally Port" (R. 118 [19-20]; 
State's Exhibits 1, 2, and 4). Nevertheless, as the codefendant pushed a food cart from 
the multi-purpose room into the entrance of the "Sally Port," one of the guards 
6 
observed codefendant turn, take an envelope from his pocket, slide it down the side of 
his body, and drop it on the floor in the comer of the "Sally Port" near the book 
depository (R. 118 [21-23, 50, 70]; see State's Exhibits 1 and 11). 
Defendant, following immediately behind the codefendant, had already aroused 
the guard's suspicion (R.118 [45, 47, 68-70]). Normally inmates on the food detail 
either carried a two-handled coffee container or placed it on a food cart to take to the 
inmates in their cells (R. 118 [25, 28]; sge State's Exhibit 2). Even when full, the 
coffee container weighs no more than 30 pounds and is easily carried (R. 118 [28, 55, 
70-71]; see State's Exhibit 2). Despite this, the guard observed defendant place the 
coffee container on the floor as he left the "servery" (R. 118 [25, 27, 69]; see State's 
Exhibits 1, 2, 4, 6, and 8). Defendant then bent over the container and began to slide it 
across the floor. IcL 
Defendant entered the "Sally Port," still bent over the coffee container, shortly 
after codefendant dropped the envelope (R. 118 [45, 68-69]). Defendant slid the coffee 
container toward the envelope, picked up the envelope, and continued to slide the 
container toward the entrance to the section where he was housed (R. 118 [26, 28-29]; 
see State's Exhibits 1 and 11, and Defendant's Exhibit 12). 
When the guard at the table in the multi-purpose room observed defendant pick 
up the envelope, he contacted the guard in the control room by intercom (R. 118 [29, 
45-46]; 119 [120-121]). When the control room guard told defendant to return to the 
7 
multi-purpose room, defendant left the coffee container next to the book depository, 
stood up, and dropped the envelope on the floor beside it (R. 118 [30]; 119 [104-106]; 
see State's Exhibits 1 and 11). A guard immediately recovered the envelope (R. 119 
[99]). 
The unmarked sealed envelope was an "indigent" envelope commonly issued to 
inmates (R. 118 [51]; 119 [99-102, 113]; see Defendant's Exhibits 13 and 14). It 
contained a small folded-up piece of inmate writing paper (R. 119 [101-103, 125-126]; 
State's Exhibit 15). Inside the folded paper was a small piece of twist-tied plastic that 
contained a quantity of cocaine (R. 119 [127, 130-131, 147-159, 163-166]; State's 
Exhibits 15, 16, and 18). 
Point II - Expert Witness Notice Issue 
Based on a prison field test, defendant was initially charged with possession of 
methamphetamine (R. 8-9; cL R. 119 [127-128]). The charge was later amended, 
changing "methamphetamine" to "cocaine", based on subsequent State Crime Lab 
testing (R. 8-9; R. 119 [20-22]). At defendant's November 7, 1996 preliminary 
hearing, a crime lab report identifying the chemist who tested the substance and 
concluded that it was cocaine, was admitted over defendant's hearsay objections (R. 3; 
R. 119 [17-19, 21]; State's Exhibit 1 [preliminary hearing], addendum J; cf State's 
Exhibit 18 [trial]). 
8 
On the morning of January 17, 1997, five days before trial, the prosecutor 
notified defense counsel by phone that the State intended to call the chemist, Ms. 
Jennifer McNair, as a witness at trial (R. 119 [23]). Although defendant subsequently 
filed two pretrial motions in limine (R. 21-24), he did not move for a continuance or 
for exclusion of Ms. McNair's testimony until after the jury had been called, and the 
trial court had resolved all previous written motions on January 22, 1997, the morning 
of the first day of trial (R. 119 [3-16, 22]).5 
In support of his oral motion for a continuance or exclusion of the chemist's 
testimony, defendant argued that Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1995) requires 30 days' 
notice that an expert is expected to testify, a copy of the expert's curriculum vitae, and 
the opinion and basis for the opinion before an expert can testify, and that the State's 
failure to strictly comply entitled defendant to a continuance or exclusion of the 
chemist's testimony (R. 119 [16]). In response to the trial court's question, defense 
counsel acknowledged that Ms. McNair's testimony would be that the substance she 
tested was cocaine (R. 119 [17]). 
While admitting he did not provide defendant with Ms. McNair's curriculum 
vitae, the prosecutor argued that defendant was on notice as to her identity and the 
substance of her testimony based on the report admitted at the preliminary hearing more 
5
 Defendant's oral motion, argument by the parties, and the trial court's ruling 
are at addendum K. 
9 
than two months before (R. 119 [17-18]). He also argued that defense counsel knew 
that, unless defendant stipulated to admission of the report at trial, the State would be 
required to call the chemist to testify about the test and its results (R. 119 [21]; see 
Utah R. Evid. 901(a) and (b)(1)). Thus, the prosecutor argued, defendant had the duty 
to prepare to meet the chemist's testimony and had ample time to do so regardless of 
whether he received her curriculum vitae or actual notice of her testimony pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (R. 119 [17, 23]). The prosecutor concluded that the real 
issue was not whether defendant had received explicit statutory notice, but whether 
defendant had been prejudiced, and that the appropriate remedy, if there were 
prejudice, would be a continuance rather than exclusion of the testimony (R. 119 [18]). 
Defense counsel responded that "it doesn't matter whether we're prejudiced 
under the statute, there's no mention of that. But we should be allowed to get these 
reports, and the basis for the opinion, which is not in the toxicology report, and be able 
to hire an expert to rebut that if we feel that there is a need to" (R. 119 [19]). 
The trial court asked if defense counsel believed she needed to hire an expert (R. 
119 [20]). Defense counsel responded that there was a discrepancy between the color 
of what was field tested at the prison and what was later tested at the crime lab, and 
that she did not know the chemist's qualifications. IcL! The prosecutor replied that any 
6
 Although defendant argued the chain of custody issue to the jury at trial (see R. 
119 [211-213]), he has not raised the issue on appeal nor has he contested that the 
substance in the envelope was cocaine. 
10 
chain of custody issue was unrelated to the expert's testimony, and that the chemist's 
background was nothing new to defense counsel (R. 119 [21, 18]). 
The trial court denied defendant's motions for a continuance or exclusion of the 
Ms. McNair's testimony, but allowed her testimony f,only as to the test made as far as 
it being a controlled substance and what it is" (R. 119 [22]). The trial court also 
stated it would allow defendant to bring in evidence about a discrepancy in the color of 
the substance, and evidence about the prior field test. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point I. Circumstantial evidence surrounding this prison drug drop was 
sufficient to establish defendant's knowing and intentional possession of cocaine. The 
timing, location, and method of transfer established a preplanned scheme, not an 
innocent or coincidental event. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, 
the evidence and reasonable inferences are not so inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. 
Point II. The prosecutor failed to strictly comply with a statutory notice 
provision by giving defendant 5 days' actual notice before trial that an expert would be 
testifying, and by giving defendant the expert's curriculum vitae on the day of trial. 
However, where defendant failed to show prejudice, the trial court was not required "as 
a matter of law" to grant a continuance or exclude the expert testimony. 
11 
The State was required to prove as an element of the charged offense that the 
substance defendant possessed was cocaine. Not less than two months before trial, 
defendant received a copy of the toxicology report which provided written notice of the 
name and address of the chemist who tested the substance and her conclusion that it 
was cocaine. The plain language of the applicable statute says information provided by 
the proponent of expert testimony must be "sufficient to give the opposing party 
adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony." Defendant had ample time to 
prepare to meet this testimony, testimony that is customary in any drug case where 
there is no stipulation as to the identity of the drug. Indeed, this was the only evidence 
that the substance defendant had possessed was cocaine. Because defendant failed to 
establish prejudice, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny a 
continuance and to refuse to exclude the testimony. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANT'S POSSESSION OF COCAINE 
WAS KNOWING AND INTENTIONAL 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he 
knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine (Def. Br. at 12-25). In support of his 
argument, defendant discusses at length selected federal authority (Def. Br. at 15-19) 
12 
which is not controlling, and is, in any event, inapposite.7 The issue is not whether 
defendant possessed the envelope containing cocaine. The evidence is undisputed that 
he did.8 The issue is whether his possession of cocaine was knowing and intentional. 
Contrary to defendant's assertion (Def. Br. at 15), Utah case law does provide a 
framework for analysis to differentiate between innocent and culpable possession. 
Under Utah law, intent and knowledge must usually be inferred from a defendant's 
conduct and surrounding circumstances. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 
1991); see also State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992) (intent may be 
inferred from facts and circumstances surrounding crime); State v. Smith, 728 P.2d 
1014 (Utah 1986) ("proof of guilty knowledge, like proof of intent, is usually 
circumstantial") (citing Tageant v. State. 673 P.2d 651, 654 (Wyo. 1983)); State v. 
Lopez. 789 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah App. 1990) ("intent need not be proved by direct 
evidence, but may be inferred from defendant's conduct and surrounding 
circumstances") (quoting State v. Davis. 711 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah 1985) (citations 
omitted)). Therefore, resolution of this issue depends on a proper review of the facts 
and circumstances. Defendant's review is flawed since he views the evidence, and all 
inferences, in favor of his innocence (see Def. Br. at 19-25). 
7
 Utah statutes define "possession" (Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-2(1 )(dd) (1996) 
and 76-1-601(9) (1996), "knowing," and "intentional" (Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-103 
(1) and (2) (1974). 
8
 See n.2 and n.6, above. 
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Under well-settled law, this Court views the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 
1201, 1205 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). Viewed in that light, the evidence and 
reasonable inferences are not so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. IdL The 
timing, location, and method of transfer here established a preplanned scheme, not an 
innocent or coincidental event. In short, defendant intentionally took possession of the 
envelope, and later dropped it, under circumstances sufficient to establish that he knew 
that it contained cocaine. 
A. Timing. The timing of the transfer is significant because defendant and his 
codefendant were housed in separate sections of the prison divided by cement walls (R. 
118 [14-15, 18, 20-23, 44, 50]; 119 [125, 138-139]; see State's Exhibits 1 and 7, and 
Defendant's Exhibit 12). But they worked together on a food detail taking dinner to 
their respective sections from a common "servery" (R. 118 [7, 18]; 119 [95-96, 120-
121]). It was during the food detail that the codefendant dropped the envelope to begin 
the transfer, with defendant a few steps behind him (R. 118 [21-23, 45, 50, 70]; see 
Defendant's Exhibit 12). Given defendant's immediate proximity, it is reasonable to 
infer that his codefendant intended to transfer the envelope and its contents to 
defendant. Moreover, the appearance of merely going about their duties serving food 
provided a good cover for their transaction. 
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B. Location, In addition to the timing of the transfer, the location is important 
since it is the guards' duty to intercept contraband (R. 118 [5-8]), and since possessing 
or transferring contraband can subject a prisoner to a strip search or an extended 
lockdown in his or her cell (R. 118 [48-49, 71, 76, 107-108, 114-116]; 119 [122]). 
Normally guards supervised inmates throughout the prison, in their sections, 
whether in or out of their cells, while they were in the yard, during prisoner recreation, 
and elsewhere (R. 118 [5, 7-8]). Even on the food detail, inmates were almost 
constantly under guards' supervision. 
The "servery," where two other inmates on the food detail were counting food 
trays, was under guard (R. 118 [41, 53, 55-57, 69]; see State's Exhibit 8). 
In the multi-purpose room (which defendant and codefendant had to cross to get 
from the "servery" to the "Sally Port"), three guards were eating dinner at their 
customary table, farthest from the entrance to the "Sally Port" (R. 118 [19-20, 61]; see 
State's Exhibits 1, 2, and 4). 
In the middle of the "Sally Port," there was a control room where a guard was 
seated in a high-back chair with his back to the entrance from the multi-purpose room 
(R. 118 [14-16, 31-32]). In addition to waist-high walls and the chair upon which he 
was seated, the control room guard's view of the corner closest to that entrance was 
obstructed by paper taped on the windows to provide some privacy for persons using 
the control room toilet (R. 118 [33-34]; see State's Exhibits 1 and 3). In that same 
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corner of the "Sally Port," there was a metal book depository that could obstruct the 
view of the guards who would be otherwise distracted eating their dinner in the far end 
of the multi-purpose room (R. 118 [31, 37]; see State's Exhibits 1, 3, 5-6, and 11, and 
Defendant's Exhibit 12). Paper taped on the window by the book depository, facing 
section 1, could also obstruct the view of the inmates housed there (see State's Exhibit 
11). And although the multi-purpose room was lighted, the "Sally Port" itself was not 
(R. 118 [35]). Reflections off the glass could also make it difficult for guards in the 
multi-purpose room and inmates in section 1 to see clearly into the "Sally Port" (Id.: 
see State's Exhibits 5 and 6). 
Not surprisingly, that is precisely where the codefendant chose to drop the 
envelope: in the corner of the unlit "Sally Port" near the book depository (R. 118 [21-
23, 50, 70]; see State's Exhibits 1 and 11). 
C. Method of transfer. Although timing and location are important, defendant's 
own conduct, both before and after the transfer, and the coordinated conduct of his 
codefendant, best establish that defendant knowingly and intentionally received the 
cocaine from the codefendant as part of a preplanned scheme. 
As the codefendant pushed a food cart into the entrance of the "Sally Port," he 
turned, took the envelope from his pocket, slid it down his leg, and dropped it onto the 
floor. He then continued to push the food cart to the entrance of his section (R. 118 
[21-23, 50, 70]). Codefendant's actions all make clear that he intentionally but 
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surreptitiously dropped the envelope. It is reasonable to infer that he intended it to be 
picked up by someone who followed. Indeed, it is reasonable to infer that when the 
eodefendant turned just before dropping the envelope, he was looking to see that 
defendant, the intended recipient, was close behind. 
Defendant had already aroused suspicion by bending over and pushing an easily-
carried coffee container along the floor from the "servery" to the corner of the "Sally 
Port" (R. 118 [25-29, 45, 47, 68-70]; see State's Exhibit 2, and Statement of Facts, p. 
7, above). If defendant had been carrying the coffee container, or rolling it on a food 
cart, he would have had to bend over to pick up the envelope. Instead, already bent 
over, he was able to easily retrieve the envelope and continue pushing the coffee 
container toward the entrance to the section where he was housed (R. 118 [26, 28-29]; 
see State's Exhibits 1 and 11, and Defendant's Exhibit 12). It is therefore reasonable 
to infer that when defendant first bent over and began pushing the coffee container, he 
knew the envelope would be dropped, and intended to be in a position to pick it up 
without attracting unnecessary attention. 
It is notable that defendant did not stand up to examine the envelope to see what 
it contained as an innocent person with no prior knowledge might do. Prison policy 
required inmates to bring unknown items to the attention of prison staff (R. 119 [145]). 
But defendant continued, bent over, to push the coffee container toward the entrance to 
his section with the envelope in hand (R. 118 [26, 28-29]). It is therefore reasonable to 
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infer that defendant already knew what it contained, and intended to take it to his cell 
or transfer it to another inmate while serving coffee in his section. In other words, his 
possession was culpable, not innocent. Cf State v. Fox. 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985) 
("Actual physical possession presupposes knowing and intentional possession"); Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1 )(dd) (1996) ("it is sufficient if it is shown that. . . the 
controlled substance is found in a place or under circumstances indicating that the 
person had the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over it"). 
When confronted moments later by the guard in the control room, who had been 
alerted via intercom by the observant guard in the multi-purpose room, defendant stood 
up and immediately dropped the envelope before returning to the multi-purpose room 
(R. 118 [30]; 119 [104-106]). Together with the other circumstances surrounding his 
retrieval of the envelope, this only underscores defendant's guilty knowledge of what it 
contained. See State v. Garcia. 663 P.2d 60, 65 (Utah 1983) (admission by conduct 
relevant as "constituting circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt"); State v. 
James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991) ("One of the circumstances traditionally used to 
supply evidence of guilt is flight or concealment of the crime") (citing 2 Wigmore, 
Evidence §§ 273, 276 (Chadbourn rev. 1979 & Supp. 1991); State v. Bales. 675 P.2d 
573 (Utah 1983) (approving instruction that concealment of property may be evidence 
of knowledge of the contraband nature of the property). 
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Finally, contrary to defendant's factual assertions (Def. Br. at 21-22), it is 
significant that the only other inmate who was outside his cell during the food detail, 
but not under guard in the "servery" during the drop, was behind defendant carrying a 
tray (R. 118 [55-56, 68-69]). He was in no position to stoop down easily and pick up 
the envelope. This fact establishes again that defendant was the intended recipient, and 
no one else. 
In sum, the opportunistic timing and specific "blind spot" location of the 
transfer, defendant's bent-over posture to push rather than carry the two-handled coffee 
container from the "servery," his proximity immediately behind the codefendant when 
the drop was made, his continued movement toward the entrance to the section where 
he was housed after retrieving the envelope, and his immediate abandonment of the 
envelope when confronted by a guard, are sufficient to establish that defendant's 
possession of cocaine was knowing and intentional. Therefore, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence and all reasonable inferences are not 
so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. 
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Point H 
THE PROSECUTOR'S LACK OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH A 
STATUTORY NOTICE PROVISION DID NOT MANDATE A 
CONTINUANCE OR EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY "AS 
A MATTER OF LAW" WHERE DEFENDANT FAILED TO SHOW 
PREJUDICE 
Defendant argues that he was entitled to a continuance or exclusion of expert 
testimony "as a matter of law" where the prosecutor failed to strictly comply with a 
statutory notice provision (Def. Br. at 25-39). Defendant's argument is undermined by 
the acknowledgment in his own brief that, under the applicable standard of review, 
such decisions are within the trial court's discretion (Def. Br. at 2 (citing State v. 
Begishe. 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah App. 1997) (the decision f,lies within the broad 
discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb such a decision absent a clear abuse 
of discretion")). It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny a 
continuance and refuse to exclude a chemist's testimony where defendant failed to show 
prejudice. See Begishe, 937 P.2d at 530; see also Stevenson v. Goodson. 924 P.2d 339 
(Utah 1996) ("The trial court is allowed considerable latitude of discretion in the 
admissibility of expert testimony, and in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, this 
court will not reverse" (citations omitted)). 
The State was required to prove as an element of the charged offense that the 
substance defendant possessed was cocaine (see R. 8-9, 73, 85). 
Not later than his preliminary hearing on November 7, 1996, defendant had 
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written notice through a State Crime Lab report of the name and address of the chemist 
who tested the substance and concluded that it was cocaine (R. 3; R. 119 [17-19, 21]; 
State's Exhibit 1 [preliminary hearing]; cf State's Exhibit 18 [trial]). In fact, the State 
Crime Lab report was admitted at the preliminary hearing over defendant's hearsay 
objections (R. 3, R. 119 [17-19, 21]). Therefore, unless defendant stipulated to 
admission of the report at trial, it was clear from the date of his preliminary hearing 
that the State would be required to call the chemist to testify about the test and its 
results (see Utah R. Evid. 901(a) and (b)(1); 1101(b)(5)). Such testimony is customary 
in any drug case where there is no stipulation. Indeed, the crime lab report was the 
only evidence that the substance defendant had possessed was cocaine. 
On the morning of January 17, 1997, five days before trial, the prosecutor orally 
notified defendant that the State intended to call the chemist, Ms. Jennifer McNair, as a 
witness at trial (R. 119 [23]). On January 22, 1997, after the jury had been called and 
the trial court had resolved defendant's written motions on other matters, defendant 
made an oral motion for a continuance, and then for exclusion of the chemist's 
testimony (R. 119 [3-16, 22]). In support of his motion, defendant argued that he was 
not required to establish prejudice under the notice statute, and implied that he was 
entitled to the requested relief as a matter of law (R. 119 [19]). On appeal he has since 
made that argument explicit (Def. Br. at 26-28), although he has argued prejudice in 
the alternative (Def. Br. at 28-39). As noted above, the standard of review section of 
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defendant's brief defeats his own "matter of law" argument. Def. Br. at 2 (citing 
Begishe, 937 P.2d at 530). His assertions of prejudice will be addressed below. 
The two grounds defendant asserted at trial for why he needed a continuance to 
obtain his own expert were that (1) there was a discrepancy between the color of the 
substance described at the prison, and reported at the Crime Lab, and (2) he did not 
know the chemist's qualifications (R. 119 [20]). Neither of these grounds is sufficient 
reason for a continuance to hire an expert witness. 
First, as the prosecutor pointed out at trial, the chain of custody issue had 
nothing to do with the chemist's testimony that the substance she tested was cocaine (R. 
119 [20-22]). Indeed, with the trial court's explicit permission (R. 119 [22]), defendant 
litigated the chain of custody issue at trial through other witnesses.9 
Second, defendant acknowledged receiving Ms. McNair's resume the day of trial 
(Def. Br. at 27) and reviewing it before trial (Def. Br. at 35). Ms. McNair was the 
State's final witness (R. 119 [159]). During the brief recitation of her qualifications at 
the beginning of her testimony (R. 119 [159-160]), defendant elected not to voir dire 
her, nor has he challenged her qualifications on appeal. 
Defendant acknowledged, in response to the trial court's question, that Ms. 
McNair would testify that the substance she tested was cocaine (R. 199 [17]). As 
already noted, defendant had notice of that fact and her identity more than two months 
9
 As already noted (n.6), defendant has opted not to pursue that issue on appeal. 
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before trial (see R. 3; R. 119 [17-19, 21]; State's Exhibit 1 [preliminary hearing]; cf 
State's Exhibit 18 [trial]), and has not contested her conclusion on appeal. 
The plain language of the applicable statute says information provided by the 
proponent of expert testimony must be "sufficient to give the opposing party adequate 
notice to prepare to meet the testimony." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(b) (1995) 
(emphasis added). The statute requires "not less than 30 days" notice before trial 
including "the name and address of the expert, the expert's curriculum vitae, and a 
copy of the expert's report." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(a) (1995). But failure to 
comply with these requirements only entitles the opposing party "to a continuance of 
the trial. . . sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony " Utah Code Ann. § 
77-17-13(3) (1995) (emphasis added). Defendant failed to establish that he did not 
know the substance of the chemist's testimony or that a continuance was necessary to 
meet that testimony. Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
refuse to grant a continuance or to exclude the chemist's testimony. 
In reviewing the denial of a defendant's request for a continuance or other relief, 
this Court considers four factors: 
(1) the extent of appellant's diligence in his efforts to ready his defense 
prior to the date set for trial; (2) the likelihood that the need for a 
continuance could have been met if the continuance had been granted; (3) 
the extent to which granting the continuance would have inconvenienced 
the court and the opposing party; and (4) the extent to which the appellant 
might have suffered harm as a result of the court's denial. 
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Begishe. 937 P.2d at 530 (citing United States v. Flynt. 756 F.2d 1352, 1358-1359 (9th 
Cir. 1985)) (emphasis in the original). The evidence discussed above will be reviewed 
under each of these factors in turn. 
A. Defendant's diligence in preparing for trial. Defendant had more than two 
months, from the date of his preliminary hearing, to prepare to address the crime lab 
report which was the State's only evidence that the substance he had possessed was 
cocaine. In contrast to Begishe, 937 P.2d at 528, where the prosecutor surprised the 
defendant with an incriminating report from a test conducted on the afternoon of the 
first day of trial, defendant here had more than two months to hire his own expert or 
request a retest before trial. But defendant waited until 5 days after express notice the 
expert would testify and until after the jury was called to raise his oral motion for a 
continuance or exclusion of the testimony. As the trial court correctly concluded, 
defendant "had plenty of opportunity to bring [a motion] to this Court's attention" (R. 
119 [22]). Defendant obviously did not intend to stipulate to admission of the crime lab 
report: he had objected to its admission at his preliminary hearing. His complaint at 
trial about a lack of notice that the chemist who authored the report would testify was 
therefore disingenuous (see Utah R. Evid. 901(a) and (b)(1)). 
B. Likelihood continuance would have met defendant's need. Defendant failed 
to establish at trial any legitimate need for a continuance. When asked by the trial 
court why he needed a continuance to hire an expert, when he had not hired an expert 
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before, defendant proffered that an expert could help to challenge the chain of custody 
and because he was unaware of the chemist's qualifications. In denying defendant's 
motion, the trial court expressly permitted defendant to present evidence about any 
potential discrepancy in the chain of custody and results of the field test (R. 119 [22]). 
Again, defendant has not contested these issues on appeal nor contested the chemist's 
qualifications to render the opinion she did. As the moving party, defendant had the 
burden to establish the legitimate need for a continuance. See State v. Wodskow. 896 
P.2d 29, n.5 (Utah App. 1995). Defendant failed to meet that burden. 
C. Inconvenience to the court and the State. The trial had been set, pretrial 
proceedings had begun, and the jury was standing by. Defendant's oral motion was the 
last thing he raised in pretrial proceedings the morning of trial before the jury was 
called into the courtroom (R. 119 [16-24]). The State expressed that it was "prepared 
and ready to go" (R. 119 [18]). In denying defendant's motion, the trial court noted 
that it had already "reserved the time and called the jury in on this matter" (R. 119 
[22]). Defendant has provided no legitimate reason for why the trial court, the jury, 
and the State should have been inconvenienced by a delay. 
D. Extent to which defense might have been harmed as a result. This Court 
calls this "the most important among the factors." Begishe, 937 P.2d at 531. 
Defendant argued that a chain of custody issue and the chemist's qualifications were 
reasons to justify a delay at trial. But he has contested neither on appeal. Instead, 
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defendant argues for the first time on appeal that M[e]xpert testimony verifying the 
minute quantity [of powder in the envelope] and cross-examination of McNair would 
explain to the jury the unlikelihood that [defendant] would recognize the small amount 
in the sealed envelope and undercut the State's theory that [he] was involved in a drug 
transaction" (Def. Br. at 38-39). Defendant fails to explain what an expert could have 
added to the lay testimony of the guard who retrieved the envelope: that he had to hold 
it up to the light and feel it before he could determine there was something in it (R. 119 
[100, 113]). In addition, the guard who opened the sealed envelope testified he had to 
unwrap a piece of folded paper to ultimately determine that it contained drugs (R. 119 
[126-127]). Defense counsel repeatedly highlighted this evidence during closing 
argument (see R. 119 [213, 216, 218-219]). But even with this eyewitness testimony 
and argument before it, the jury rejected the underlying premise that was central to 
defendant's theory: that he did not know what was in the envelope when he picked it 
up. His belated and conclusory argument fails to establish how his own expert could 
have changed this. In short, defendant has failed to establish that he was prejudiced at 
trial.10 
10
 In Begishe, 937 P.2d at 531 n.5, this Court wrote: 
Because appellant has successfully demonstrated prejudice in any event, it 
is not necessary for us to definitively decide who ultimately has the 
burden to show prejudice or lack of prejudice when there has been a 
violation of section 77-17-13. CJL State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 921 
(Utah 1987) (stating, in context of Rule 16(a)(5) violation, that "when the 
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Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny a 
continuance and to refuse to exclude the chemist's testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction and sentence should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _2/yf~day of January, 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
BARNARD N. MADSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
defendant can make a credible argument that the prosecutor's errors have 
impaired the defense, it is up to the State to persuade the court that there 
is no reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the outcome of trial 
would have been more favorable for the defendant"). 
Where, as here, defendant completely failed to demonstrate prejudice at the trial level, 
it is likewise unnecessary for this Court to definitively decide who ultimately bears the 
burden on appeal. However, where defendant was the moving party and failed to 
prevail below, his burden should not be shifted to the State on appeal. 
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Addendum A 
(State's Exhibit 2, photograph of the coffee container defendant bent over 
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Addendum B 
(State's Exhibit 3, photograph showing paper taped in the corner window 
of the control room) 

Addendum C 
(State's Exhibit 4, photograph showing tables in the multi-purpose room) 

Addendum D 
(State's Exhibit 5, photograph showing the "Sally Port" area, the control room, 
and reflections off the windows) 

Addendum £ 
(State's Exhibit 6, photograph showing a view from the multi-purpose room 










(State's Exhibit 8, photograph of the entrance to the "servery") 
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Addendum H 
(State's Exhibit 11, photograph showing the book depository in the corner of 




(Photocopy of a portion of State's Exhibit 1, a diagram of the prison, 
showing marks and labels by witnesses) 

Addendum J 
(State's Exhibit 1 [preliminary hearing], the State Crime Lab report) 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRIME LABORATORY REPORT PAGE: 1 
4501 SOUTH 2700 WEST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84119 
(801) 965-4487 
CL Case #: S 963363 Submitted Date: 6/26/96 
Submitted By: MICK SPILKER Phone: 2655686 
Agency Code/No.: CIB CORRECTIONS/INVESTIGATI 3965944 
Delivered By: SAME Phone: 
Received By: T.BAZARNIK Phone: 9644547 
Crime Date/Time: 60296 17:00 Crime: DRUGS DRUGS 
How Received: IN PERSON AT THE CENTRAL CRIME LAB 
Hazardous Materials: NO 
Location: DRUG SHELF 
Suspect Last Name 
LUCBRO 











CHAIN OF CUSTODY STATEMENT RE: Chain of Custody 
The item(s) submitted under the police agency case numbers referenced 
in this report were in a sealed condition at the time any examination, 
testing or analysis was commenced by the undersigned, and that said 
examination or handling, if any, of the actual items within any such 
sealed containers was accomplished in a manner to preserve the integrity 
of the item to assure that any chance of misidentification, or 
environmental or cross-contamination would be avoided by adherence to 
standardized procedures within the Utah State Crime Laboratory appropriate 
to any processes applicable to the examination, analysis or testing of 
said items* Any deviation from said procedures, and reasons therefore 
is noted below. The breaking of any seal or part of the container in 
which the item was submitted, has been followed by a reinsertion of 
the item into its original container, following any examination, testing 
or analysis and resealing of that container with the undersigned's 




Criminalistic Analysis Report Follows 
7/23/96 
14:57:05 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRIME LABORATORY REPORT 
4501 SOUTH 2700 WEST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84119 
(801) 965-4487 
PAGE: 
CL Case #: S 963363 Submitted Date: 6/26/96 
Submitted By: MICK SPILKER 
Agency Code/No.: CIB CORRECTIONS/INVESTIGATI 3965944 
Phone; 2655686 
Delivered By: SAME 
Received By: T.BAZARNIK 
Suspect Last Name First Name Middle 
LUCERO RICHARD 









1. Cocaine was identified in the piece of plastic. The total weight of 
the white powder was 50 milligrams. 
'r^> ^ ^Ji^UuL 







STATE OF UTAH CRIME LAB 






Y, Case #: S 96 3363 Submitted Date: b ''26/96 
-Submitted By: MICK SPIiKER 
Agency Code/No.: CIB C0KRECT10NS/INVESTIGATI \ 3965944 \ 







60296 17:00 Crime: DftUGS 
IN PERSON AT THE CENTRAL CRIME LAB 
Hazardous Materials: NO 
Special TEST FOR AMPHETAMINE, COCAINE 
Request 




LN# V/S Last Name 
000 S LUCERO 
First Name 
RICHARD 
Middle Name DOB Sex Race 
M 
LN# Item* Description Location 
001 00001 PIECE OF PAPER CONTAINING YELLOW/WHITE POWDER 
{ CS } DRUG SHELF 
Sub Date Rel Date 
6/26/96 0/00/00 
D a t e / T i m e : 
L-2W6 OVOO 
Rece at e/Time: 
Addendum K 
(R. 119 [16-23]; Defendant's motion, the parties' argument, 
and the trial court's ruling] 
1 something because he was fearful of what might take 
2 1 place. But I will not allow anything as to what has 
3 taken place as a result of this case. 
41 MR. CASTLE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
5I MS. BOWMAN: I had one other problem, one 
61 other motion. I received a notice on Friday that 
7 Mr. Castle intends to call a criminalist from the State 
8 1 Crime Lab, and apparently intends to introduce expert 
9 testimony. 
10 As you're aware, Your Honor, 77-17-13, the 
111 state is required to give 30 days' notice, a copy of 
12 the curriculum vitae, and the opinion and the basis for 
13 that opinion. 
14 It's clearly expert testimony, and obviously a 
15I lay person can't testify that it is or is not cocaine. 
161 That particular statute indicates that if the 
17| defense — or, the prosecution fails to meet the 
18 requirements of the section, the opposing party shall 
19 be entitled to a continuance. 
20 So I think that that is the first remedy. It 
211 also allows you to impose whatever sanctions you wish 
22 or feel are appropriate. I feel that appropriate 
231 sanctions would be to exclude this testimony. 
24| The state has known about this from the filing 
251 of the case. They clearly should have given us this 
16 
ll written information 3 0 days prior to the trial, instead 
2 of a phone message this past Friday. 
3 I would move to exclude the testimony of the 
4 1 expert witness from the State Crime Lab. 
5 THE COURT: What's the expert witness going to 
6 testify to; as to the substance, the substance is 
71 cocaine? 
8I MS. BOWMAN: Yes. 
9 MR. CASTLE: I'd like to respond, if I could, 
10 to back up. 
Ill THE COURT: Let me say — is that what you're 
121 saying? 
13I MS. BOWMAN: That's what I believe the state's 
14 intending to do. 
15 MR. CASTLE: If we can back up to the time of 
161 the preliminary hearing, Your Honor, which was months 
171 ago, we had a preliminary hearing, and the expert 
181 witnesses, the toxicology report, was provided to 
19I Ms. Bowman at that time. 
201 The toxicology report was offered into 
21 evidence at that time identifying Jennifer McNair as 
221 the criminalist. 
23 Her testimony is contained in that report. 
241 Ms. Bowman knows that. With respect to her curriculum 
25 vitae, it's true that I didn't provide that, but this 
17 
1 is the type of case that Ms. Bowman thoroughly familiar 
2 with when it comes to the testimony of a criminalist, 
3 saying that this substance in fact was a controlled 
4 1 substance. 
5I We have a lot of drug cases, and the question 
6 that I think needs to be addressed is: Has she been 
7 prejudiced as a result of that? 
8 And sanctions, it certainly isn't to exclude 
9 the evidence at this point, because her motion is 
101 untimely. 
Ill If she was worried about that, she should have 
12 filed the motion before now. The appropriate sanction, 
13 if you feel that it's prejudicial to her and her 
14 client, is to continue this case to another date. The 
151 state is prepared and ready to go. 
16 Ms. McNair's testimony, and her background, is 
17 not going to be anything new to Ms. Bowman, and it's 
18 not something that has not been covered by other 
19 1 criminalists. She's simply going to testify that she 
201 has a degree in chemistry and that she works at the 
211 Crime Lab, and has for the last couple of years, and 
22 her job is to test what are suspected controlled 
23 J substances, and that as a result of her training and 
241 her experience, she's going to testify that this 
25 substance is cocaine. 
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1 MS, BOWMAN: Your Honor, that report was 
2 allowed at the preliminary hearing over my objection. 
3 The report is inconsistent with the field test 
4 1 performed by the prison, and the report is in the 
51 police records in this case. 
61 This is not a routine case where everybody 
7 finds the same drugs or the same quantities. There are 
81 discrepancies between what was reported at the prison 
9 1 and the report that was allowed at the preliminary 
10 hearing. 
11 Furthermore, part of the purpose of the 
121 statute is to allow us to hire an expert to rebut any 
13 testimony, but we don't have the resources to go hire 
141 an expert for every single report we get. 
15 We expect notice from the state under this 
16 statute, and they likewise expect it from us if we're 
17 going to hire an expert or obtain or use an expert to 
18 testify about something. 
19 Clearly, expert testimony fits within the 
201 statute, and it doesn't matter whether we're prejudiced 
21 under the statute, there's no mention of that. But we 
221 should be allowed to get these reports, and the basis 
231 for the opinion, which is not in the toxicology report, 
24I and be able to hire an expert to rebut that if we feel 
25 that there is a need to. 
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l] We don't have resources to go hire an expert 
21 right and left, based upon every toxicology report in 
3 every single drug case. 
41 THE COURT: Has anything led you to believe 
5 that you need to hire an expert to rebut that? 
61 MS. BOWMAN: Yes, Your Honor. There is a 
7 discrepancy between what was found at the prison and 
8 what was field-tested at the prison when the prison 
9 supposedly had experts out there doing it, according to 
101 other officers, who claimed that this lieutenant was 
11 very well trained in giving field tests. 
12 And the discrepancy is that the color of the 
131 substance is different when it was found at the prison, 
14 difference from what is reported in the toxicology 
15 report. 
16 And as in any chemistry matter, the color of 
17 the unknown substance is critical in analysis. We 
18 don't have any report about that. It is simply 
19 mentioned in the state crime lab, that the substance is 
20 white. 
21 All of the prison records report it as 
221 yellowish or yellowish-white or creme. It may not be 
23I the same substance. I don't know what was tested. I 
24 don't know what her qualifications are. 
25 MR. CASTLE: Your Honor, with respect to the 
20 
II color of the substance, whether the right substance was 
2 1 tested, that's an issue of chain* I don#t want the 
3 issue to become chain. I don't want the issue to be 
4 chain of custody, different drugs, how they got to the 
5 prison. 
6I Ms. Bowman has known at the preliminary 
7 hearing that we submitted the toxicology report that 
8] was allowed under the reliable hearsay provision. She 
9 knew that there was an expert there. She knows, and 
101 for many years she's practiced law, that unless she's 
11 stipulating to that report, I have to bring in the 
121 criminalist to testify about the drugs and with respect 
13 to the field test. 
141 I find it sort of curious that Ms. Bowman now 
151 is relying on the field test, because most drug cases, 
16 if we try to get the field test in, they're objecting 
17 saying that the field test is unreliable, and the 
18 person who tested the drugs was not a criminalist, not 
19 a chemist. 
20I She simply used one of those nick tests to 
21 determine what — . 
22 MS. BOWMAN: And I object to that. 
231 MR. CASTLE: To determine what the substance 
24 is. And the substance that the field test — it only 
251 provides a presumption of what it is. And in talking 
21 
I 
1 with the officers, they indicated to me that what 
21 they're trying to establish was that it was a 
31 controlled substance. 
4I And that's why Ms. McNair's testimony is 
51 important, because she's the one qualified to test it. 
6 THE COURT: Okay, Counsel. The Court is going 
71 to do this: The Court is going to deny the defendant's 
81 motion, first of all, as far as a continuance is 
91 concerned; that the Court has been in contact with both 
10 counsel in this case, and they've had plenty of 
11 opportunity to bring to this Court's attention if you 
12 were going to raise this before. 
13 This Court has reserved the time and called 
14 the jury in on this matter. The Court thinks both of 
151 you were derelict in that particular action as far as a 
16 continuance. 
17 As far as the evidence is concerned, the Court 
181 is going to allow the expert to testify only as to the 
19 test made as far as it being a controlled substance and 
2 0 what it is. 
21 The Court will allow any testimony from the 
22I defense as far as any color of substance. If she 
231 wishes to bring in testimony as far as the field test 
24 was concerned at the prison, which may be in 



























MS. BOWMAN: Could we clarify for the record 1 
that the first notice I received from Mr. Castle about 1 
calling this criminalist was January the 17th, the J 
message at 10:50? I did not speak directly to him, but 1 
he spoke to my secretary. 1 
And the state criminalist is not listed as a 1 
witness in the information, and was not called at the 
preliminary hearing to clarify that. 1 
THE COURT: Is that your understanding, 1 
Mr. Castle? 
MR. CASTLE: Your Honor, that is my 1 
understanding. She was not called as a witness. 1 
THE COURT: Yes or no. 1 
MR. CASTLE: I'm sorry? 
THE COURT: Was that your understanding? Yes I 
or no. 1 
MR. CASTLE: Yes. 1 
THE COURT: Thank you. And anything else? J 
MS. BOWMAN: No, Your Honor. 1 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(Whereupon, the in camera proceedings 1 
came to a close; after which, the 1 
following proceedings continued in the 1 
1 presence and hearing of jury panel and 1 
defendant:) 
23 
